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PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A SYNOPSIS
The endeavor of products liability law is to allocate the costs of inju-
ries caused by defective products between manufacturers or sellers and
consumers. Judical formulae which have been devised to effect this allo-
cation have undergone and will continue to undergo modifications as
pressure is applied by one side or the other. If the allocation process is
viewed as a continuum, the doctrine of caveat emptor represents that end
of the continuum most favorable to sellers in that the risk of injury is
placed entirely upon the buyer or consumer. Strict liability represents
the other end of the continuum, as that continuum is delineated by cur-
rent jurisprudence, and places much of the cost of injuries from defective
products upon the seller or manufacturer. The purpose of this presenta-
tion is to review the current theories of recovery which are available to
the consumer who is injured by a defective product.
A basic tenet of common law is that losses should be -borne by the
person who incurs them unless there is some valid reason for shifting the
loss to another. A theory or legal justification is a prerequisite to the
transfer of a loss. Today there are three such theories available to the
plaintiff in a products liability case: first the theory of negligence by the
defendant, and second the breach of a commercial code warranty by the
defendant, and third, the theory of strict tort liability. The initial portion
of the discussion will be devoted to a brief overview of the scope and lim-
itations of these three theories as they relate to products liability.
A second basic principle of the common law is that the plaintiff has
to prove his case. Unless this is done, a favorable theory will be of little
assistance to a plaintiff in his effort to transfer his loss to the defendant.
The differences in the proof requirements of the three theories of product
liability will comprise the second and third parts of the discussion.
I. THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORIES OF RECOVERY
A. Negligence
The theory of negligence is one step removed from the doctrine of
caveat emptor. Under negligence law the seller must exercise care to as-
sure that the goods which he sells do no harm to the buyer.' This obli-
gation to exercise care is often called a duty of care. If the seller does not
exercise the requisite amount of care, he will have breached his duty, and
if damages are suffered by the defendant as a result of that breach the
plaintiff is liable. This imposition of a duty of care upon the seller rep-
resents a departure from -the original rule of caveat emptor. In recogni-
tion of that fact the courts historically held a seller liable only for harm
'W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTs 648 (3rd ed. 1964).
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done to buyers. The existance of a contract between the buyer and the
seller constituted the judicial justification for the deviation from caveat
emptor2 Subsequently, the seller's duty was expanded to include a duty
of care for the benefit of the general public, if the article he sold was "in-
herently" dangerous, presumably upon the theory that the seller was in a
better position to alleviate the harm. This was the rule until 1916 when
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company' defined inherently dangerous to
include everything that was dangerous if negligently made, and in effect
created a general duty of care to the public on the part of the seller. To-
day a seller of goods is under an obligation imposed by law to exercise
the care of a reasonable man to assure that the goods he produces do no
harm to consumers.4
This brief -historical summary of negligence law indicates that there
are two aspects to the problem of allocating losses. First there is the
problem of delineating the class of persons who are to be relieved of
losses. Historically, only immediate buyers from sellers could transfer
their losses to the seller; today all forseeable consumers have access to
that privilege. The second aspect of risk allocation, the criterion of liabil-
ity, limits the ability to shift losses to sellers under negligence law. The
standard imposed upon the seller under negligence law is only a duty to
exercise ordinary care. Therefore if the seller exercises the required
amount of care, the buyer may not recover. If the objective is to impose
greater liability upon the seller for the losses incurred by consumers, the
duty to exercise care must be replaced by a standard imposing liability in
more absolute terms. Such a standard is available from another area of
the law, but this standard has its own built-in limitations.
B. Contractural Commercial Code Warranty
A warranty is an affirmation or a promise. It is not a fault concept
which will be satisfied if the seller puts forth his best effort. If the terms
of the warranty are not fulfilled, the warrantor is liable. Although war-
ranties were part of the common law,5 they were codified along with the
rest of sales law when the various states adopted the Uniform Sales Act."
Through this process of codification, warranties became identified with
contracts and with statutory law in the early part of the 1900's. Section
15(2) of the Sales Act, and its successor, Section 2-314 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, contain the warranty of merchantability which is of
2See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842); W. PROSSER,
LAw OF TORTS § 96 (3rd ed. 1964).
3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 648 (3rd ed. 1964).
5 See Rogers & Co. v. Niles & Co., 11 Ohio St. 48 (1860).
6 The UNIFORM SALES Acr was adopted in Ohio in 1908, Act of May 9, 1908, 99 Laws of
Ohio 413-35.
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particular interest to consumers in product liability actions.7 The war-
ranty of merchantability, unless excluded, is an implicit part of every con-
tract between a buyer and a seller, and provides generally that the seller
warrants that the goods are fit for the purpose for which such goods are
normally used." This warranty is a term of the contract implied by law.
Therefore if the consumer has the benefit of a warranty of merchanta-
bility, the exercise of care by the seller will not relieve the seller of liabil-
ity.
The Uniform Sales Act however was not designed for the benefit of
consumers, and the warranty of merchantability by its terms was limited
to buyers and sellers as defined, thus requiring privity of contract." This
requirement of privity was somewhat liberalized by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, which provides that members of the buyer's family and guests
in the buyer's home may take advantage of any warranty existing between
the buyer and the seller.10 Two other provisions of the commercial codes
presented difficulty for the consumer who was injured by a defective
product. One was the requirement that the defendant be given notice of
the breach of implied warranty within a reasonable period of time," and
the other was a provision which allows the seller to disclaim all warran-
ties, including the warranty of merchantability, by giving appropriate no-
tice. 2
C. Strict Liability In Tort
Even with the possibility of two alternative remedies, negligence and
the commercial code warranty of merchantability, the consumer at least
in theory was not in a good position to collect if he was injured by a defec-
tive product. Under negligence law the seller could escape liability by
exercising reasonable care. Further, the consumer had to prove that the
seller was negligent which was sometimes difficult even with the help of
res ipsa loquitur. If the buyer brought his action against the retailer it
was often discovered that the retailer was simply not negligent." If the
7 The UNIFOEm CONMfMER IAL CODE, hereafter cited as U.C.C., replaced the UNIFORM SALES
Acr in Ohio in 1962, Act of May 18, 1961, 129 Laws of Ohio 13-183.
8 See U.C.C. § 2-314, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.27 (Page 1962). Section 15(2) of
the UNIFORM SALES Acr provided:
Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that
description... there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable
quality.
9 See § 76 of the UNmIFOp SALES Acr for definitions of the terms buyer and seller as they
are used in the Act
1OU.C.C. § 2-318, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.31 (Page 1962).
11 UNIFOLM SALES ACT § 49; U.C.C. § 2-607 (3), Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.65 (Page
1962).
12 UNIFOnit SALES Acr § 71; U.C.C. § 2-316, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page
1962).
13 See text accompanying note 44 infra.
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consumer tried to collect from the manufacturer, it was 'hard to prove that
the manufacturer was negligent in his manufacturing process.
The primary problem with the Uniform Sales Act warranty of mer-
chantability was that very few consumers could obtain its benefit because
of the requirement of privity of contract. If the father purchased food,
only the father had privity of contract, not the members of his family, un-
til this requirement was liberalized by the U.C.C. 4 Further there was
always the chance that the warranty would be lost by a failure to give no-
tice or by a disclaimer of the seller.
An action for negligence then had the advantage of providing a cause
of action for a large class of consumers while it had the disadvantage of
allowing sellers to escape liability upon a showing that reasonable care
was exercised. The warranty of merchantability had the advantage of im-
posing absolute liability upon the seller, but its disadvantage was that it
was unavailable to many consumers. The solution was to take the best
parts of both theories, combine them, and create a new theory for con-
sumers, strict liability in tort. Although the actual process was not nearly
as simple as the above presentation might make it appear, this is essentially
what happened.
1. "Implied Warranty" in Tort
In Ohio as in most other states15 the most serious pressure for a con-
sumer remedy which did not contain the pitfalls of negligence and com-
mercial code warranties came in cases where consumers were injured by de-
fective food. In 1928 an Ohio court of appeals came up with the theory
that the consumer was a beneficiary of the commercial code warranty of
merchantability existing between the retailer and the manufacturer.16
Through this device the court was able to provide a remedy which im-
posed absolute liability upon the manufacturer for the sale of defective
products, and a remedy which was at the same time available to numerous
consumers. The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed however, and contin-
ued to hold that the only warranties which the law would recognize were
those provided by the Uniform Sales Act, and those warranties required
privity of contract.'7
Courts in other states however, assisted the consumers cause by deter-
mining that warranties were not the exclusive providence of contracts
and commercial codes.' It was pointed out that "in the beginning" an
action for breach of warranty was a tort action to give relief for the
14See Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
15 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 674 (3rd ed. 1964).
16Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
17Welsh v. Ledyard, 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1957).
18 See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913); Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
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breach of a duty assumed by the seller.19 Once the courts discovered this
standard of liability the remaining task was to provide some rationaliza-
tion for attaching the standard to the manufacturer of goods. Two ex-
planations emerged. One was that through his advertising and other
selling activity the seller made his warranty directly to the consumer, and
the other was that the warranty ran with the goods.20
The doctrine of "implied warranty in tort" developed in Ohio along
the same lines as it had in other states. In Rogers v. Toni Home Perma-
nent Company2' a tort warranty was formulated and was imposed upon
the manufacturer because of his advertising to consumers. In Lonzrick
v. Republic Steel Corporation,22 the Ohio Supreme Court completed the
evolution by dropping the advertising rationalization.
The "implied warranty in tort" which the Supreme Court announced
is a warranty of merchantability. This means that the goods must be fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. 3 The standard
of liability thus imposed is the same as it was under the U.C.C. warranty
of merchantability. Unlike the U.C.C. warranty of merchantability, the
"implied warranty in tort" does not require privity of contract and gener-
ally is available to all consumers. In short, strict liability was imposed
upon the seller under the rationalization of an "implied warranty in
tort." The important characteristics of an "implied warranty in tort" as
that term has been developed by the courts are first, that liability is im-
posed upon the seller or manufacturer regardless of the amount of care
exercised by him, and second that this liability is imposed for the benefit
of all those consumers whose presence could be anticipated. 4
2. The Restatement § 402A
Earlier it was indicated that warranties, through the process of codifi-
cation in the commercial codes, had become identified with the subject of
contracts. Although the "implied warranty in tort" has little in common
with the commercial code warranties, confusion developed 'because of the
common usage of the word warranty. To eliminate this confusion and in
recognition of the fact that "[ilt would be far simpler if it were simply said
that there is strict liability in tort, declared outright, without an illusory
contract mask,"25 several state courts have dropped all talk of warranty
10 This is the language that was used by the Ohio Supreme Court when they adopted strict
liability, Lonazrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St.2d 227, 234, 218 N.E.2d 185,191 (1966).
20 See Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
21 167 Ohio St 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
22 6 Ohio St.2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
23 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St.2d 227, 229, 218 N.E.2d 185, 187 (1966).
24 See the text accompanying note 69 infra for the elements of the strict liability cause of
action in Ohio.
-W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 681 (3rd ed. 1964); see also Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d
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and instead talk about strict liability. The drafters of the Restatement
agreed, and in 1965, purporting to restate the law, a new section was
added to the Restatement of Torts entitled "Special Liability of Seller of
Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer".26  The Restatement
drops the "implied warranty" rationalization and simply provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer....
The term strict liability when used in connection with products liabi-
lity includes both "implied warranty in tort" and the Restatement §402A.
Since both the Restatement and the Lonzrick court accomplish the same
objective it would seem that much confusion could be eliminated if the
Ohio courts would also drop the "implied warranty in tort" rationaliza-
tion and confine the name of the remedy to strict liability.
II. PROOF OF CAUSATION IN FACT
Three causes of action have been identified which are available to the
victim of a defective product. Although there are overlaps between the
three causes of action, each has a standard for the imposition of liability
upon the seller, and each has a class of victims which it is designed to pro-
tect. A substantial component of the successful products liability cause
of action ,has thus far not been mentioned. This is the proof of causation
in fact, a requirement common to all three causes of action identified
above. Causation in fact means that the injury sustained by the plaintiff
must be traced to -the defendant through a series of cause and effect
stages. Because of geographical dispersement and multiple channels of
product distribution, proof of causation is one of the more difficult prob-
lems with a products liability case.
Causation in fact is a common requirement, and is undertaken in the
same way for each of -the causes of action identified above.T Unless a
plaintiff proves causation he will not recover for his injuries. Once a
plaintiff does prove causation, he may or may not be able to recover de-
pending upon whether or not he can meet the additional individual re-
quirements of one of the causes of action set out previously. Therefore
the following discussion of causation is intended to apply to a products
liability case without regard to the theory of recovery which is being
pursued.
The sequential cause and effect stages of a products liability case are as
443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, 154 Conn. 549,
227 A. 2d 418 (1967); Olney v. Beaman Bottling Co., 418 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1967).2 6 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See note 70 infra for the text of
§ 402A.27 See 1 FRUMER & FREDiAN, PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 11.01 (1964); Prosser, The Assault
Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YALE I.J. 1099, 1114-15 (1960).
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follows. First, it is necessary to show that the injury was caused by the
product. Second, it must be proven that the injury resulted 'because of a
defect in the product, and third, the defect has to be traced to the manu-
facturer or the defendant.28 The reader should be cautioned that in some
cases one or more of these distinct steps are telescoped together, and at
times a step is either assumed or uncontested. For the sake of darity
these steps will be treated individually.
That the injury was caused by the product - If a household appliance
explodes and inflicts cuts and bruises upon the person of the plaintiff it is
relatively easy to show that the immediate cause of the injury was the prod-
uct, especially if the remains of the product are available. On the other
hand when the injury results from a contaminated ham sandwich it may
be necessary to determine the specific identity of the offending food. In
the case of drugs or cosmetics the initial problem again is to establish that
a particular drug or cosmetic caused the injury. Medical records, expert
testimony, and the testimony of the plaintiff and any eye witnesses may be
required to show which product caused the injury. 9
That the injury was caused by a defect in the product - A defect is a
condition or characteristic of a product which if found to exist will lead to
liability on the part of the seller or manufacturer. It is that characteristic
of the product which makes it inadequate. Absolute proof that the injury
is the result of a defect is not essential. If the plaintiff can establish facts
sufficient to allow a jury to infer that there is a defect, and that this defect
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, he will have sus-
tained his burden of proof.30 As a matter of common knowledge soda
bottles do not explode unless there is a defect so that in such a case the in-
ference of a defect almost automatically follows once injury by the prod-
uct has been shown. However, in the case of an automobile accident, there
are many agencies which could have caused the injury, one of which might
be the driver. In these cases where multiple causes are a possibility, it is
essential that the plaintiff pinpoint the alleged defect, or that he eliminate
causes other than the alleged defect. Again expert testimony will often be
necessary to supply the circumstantial evidence which will allow the jury
to reach the conclusion.31 Demonstrative evidence may be utilized to
good advantage in products liability cases! 2 Accident reports of law en-
281 FRUMER & FRiEDMAN, PRoDucrS LIABILITY § 11.01 (1964).
2 9 Winner, Techniques In Handling A Products Liability Case-Gathering and Presenting
Evidence, 47 NEB. L.R. 316, 325 (1968).
3 0 PROSSER, LAW OP TORTS 245 (3rd ed. 1964); Emroch, Pleading and Proof In A Strict
Products Liability Case, 1966 INS. L.J. 581, 591.
31 Frumer & Friedman suggest that many trials of products liability cases boil down to a
battle of the experts, with the jury being given the job of resolving the conflicting testimony, 1
FRUMER & FRIEuDAN, PRODUCrS LTABIrY § 12.02 (1964).
32 Types of demonstrative evidence include models, diagrams, photographs, motion pditures,
and tests in court, 3 FRUMIER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LxAB=rrn § 49.02 (1964).
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forcement agencies and maintenance reports of offending machines should
also provide helpful evidence.
Tracing the defect to the defendant - Assuming that the plaintiff has
successfully attributed his injury to some alleged defect in the product, his
next problem will be to show that the defect existed when the product left
-the defendant. O'Donnell v. Geneva Metal Wheel Company" demon-
strates one method of accomplishing this objective. In O'Donnell the
plaintiff was inflating a tire when the wheel flew apart injuring -him. The
plaintiff's -theory was that the wheel was defective because the rivets hold-
ing it together were defective and cracked, and that this condition had ex-
isted when the wheel left the defendant manufacturer. To prove that the
rivets were defective when -the wheel left the defendant's plant the plain-
tiff introduced testimony from two expert engineers, who had examined
the remains of the wheel, to the effect that the rivets were defective as
charged. The defendant on the other hand -introduced evidence to show
that his quality control would prevent defective wheels from leaving the
plant. The court ruled that the question was one for the jury. Here the
method employed by the plaintiff to prove his case was the use of affirma-
tive evidence.
A second approach, demonstrated by the facts in Cusumano v. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Company,34 involves the elimination of all agencies which
could have caused the defect in the product between the time that the
product left the defendant and the time of the injury, thereby establish-
ing the inference that the product was defective when it left the defend-
ant. In Cusumano the defendant's deliveryman left several cases of
Pepsi-Cola in the plaintiff's storeroom. Several days later the plaintiff
picked up a case, the bottom of the case fell out and the plaintiff was in-
jured. To prove that the case was defective when it was left by the de-
fendant's deliveryman, the plaintiff accounted for the persons who had
been in and out of the storeroom between the time that the case was left
by the deliveryman and the time of the injury. The inference that the
case was defective when -it left the defendant was permissible after the
elimination of other potential causes."a
In some types of products liability cases it is not difficult to prove that
the alleged defect existed when the product left the hands of the manufac-
turer. If a plaintiff should contend that a cigarette is defective because it
causes cancer, there would be little dispute over the question of whether
the product was in the same condition when it was smoked by the plaintiff
as it was when it left the defendant's plant. Where the product is alleged
to be defective because it is improperly designed, the product itself or a
33 1&3 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1950).
349 Ohio App. 2d 105, 223 NXE.2d 477 (1967).
35 The court however seemed to merge the issue of res ipsa loquitur with proof of the de-
fective condition when the product left the control of the defendant.
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new product identical to it, would demonstrate the design when it left the
defendant.36 If the alleged defect is an inadequate warning the plaintiff
can enter the label or instructions that came with the product into evi-
dence in order to prove that the defect existed when the product left the
hands of the defendant.8 7
In proving 'that a defect existed when the product left the defendant's
plant, the passage of time, although certainly an important factor, will not
necessarily defeat the plaintiff's recovery.38  Under these circumstances
it will generally be impossible to eliminate all the causes that could have
caused 'the defect between the time the product left the defendant and the
time of the injury. On the positive side the plaintiff may be able to prove
that other consumers or users have had similar problems with the product,
thus establishing a characteristic of the product from which the inference
of a defect may be drawn. 9 The results of tests made by the manufac-
turer or by independent laboratories may provide evidence to help over-
come the difficulties presented by the passage of time. 0
III. COMPLETING THE CAUSE OF ACTION
As a consequence of having proven causation in fact, the plaintiff in
the products liability case will have isolated some alleged defect of a
product, attributable to the defendant, for which the plaintiff proposes
to impose liability upon the defendant. Earlier it was indicated that each
of the three causes of action, negligence, commercial code warranty, and
strict liability imposes its own standard of liability and has its own class
of victims which it is designed to protect. Therefore the discussion will
now have to center upon each of these causes of action on an individual
basis to determine whether the standard of liability has been violated,
and to determine whether the plaintiff is within the protected class of vic-
tims. The starting point under each cause of action will be upon the as-
sumption that the plaintiff has identified some alleged defect which he
is contending should result in the imposition of liability upon the defend-
ant.
A. Negligence
A person is negligent when he fails to conform his behavior to a cer-
3 6 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1963) represents a case where the alleged defect was one of design.
3 7 Winner, Techniques In Handling A Products Liability Case-Gathering and Presenting
Evidence, 47 NB. L.R. 316, 323 (1968).
3 8 Burns v. Pennsylvania Rubber & Supply Co., 117 Ohio App. 12, 19, 189 N.E.2d 645, 651
(1961); Note, Time Lapse In Products Liability, 4 WnILLMrETr L.J. 394 (1967).
so ld.
4 0 Discovery procedures may be used to discover complaints and investigative reports involv-
ing the same product, tests made by the manufacturer, modifications to the product after the
injury, and reports relating to the repair of the product; 3 FRtrMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCrS
LTABuTy § 47.01 (1964).
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tain standard of conduct imposed by law for -the protection of others.41
In terms of products liability this means that a seller must exercise the
care of a reasonable man of ordinary prudence to insure that the goods
which he sells do no harm to the plaintiff.42 More specifically, a manu-
facturer is expected to:
1. Exercise care in the design of products so that they will be fit for their
intended purpose,
2. Exercise care in the construction of products to insure that the ma-
terials and workmanship make the product suitable for its intended use,
3. Inspect the goods which he sells for any defects, including defects in
material and workmanship,
4. Give warnings of danger and instructions as to proper usage if the
goods cannot be made safe.43
A retailer or middleman has less responsibility.44 If the retailer knows of
a danger which would not be evident to the consumer he must warn the
consumer. Generally however, where the retailer is a mere conduit for
the goods he has no duty to inspect, nor does he have any duties in regard
to design or construction of the product unless he knows of some danger.4
In view of the standard of liability imposed above, it is evident that
liability for negligence will be imposed upon the defendant only if the
plaintiff proves first that the product was somehow defective, and second
that it was defective because of a failure to exercise care on the part of the
defendant. Since this discussion began with the assumption that the
plaintiff had identified some alleged defect, it is now incumbent upon the
plaintiff to prove that the allegation is true. He must show that the prod-
uct was somehow unfit for its intended use, or legally defective, a topic
which will be considered at some length under the discussion of strict
liability.46
Assuming that the plaintiff has proven that the product was legally
defective he must now prove that the seller's exercise of care would have
prevented the defective product from leaving the seller's place of business
in its defective condition. The seller on the other hand will attempt to
show that although the product was defective, care was exercised in the
construction stages, the product was inspected, and therefore the defective
condition was an unavoidable accident which the conduct of a reasonable
man could not have prevented. The seller may well succeed in his de-
41W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTs 146 (3rd ed. 1964).
421d. at 648.
43 1 FRUMR & FRmDMA, PRODUCrS LuABirrn §§ 6-8 (1964); W. PRossmt, LAW OF
TORTS 648-49 (3rd ed. 1964).
44 See Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953); W. PRossER,
LAw oF TORTs 650 (3rd ed. 1964).
45 FRUMER & FRIDMAN, PRODUCrS LiABrLriy § 18.03-04 (1964).
46 See the text accompanying note 86 infra.
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fense because the standard of liability is only violated by a failure to ex-
ercise care.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur however is available to help the
plaintiff put teeth into the standard of liability imposed by negligence
law.47 This doctrine is a rule of evidence which provides that it is unnec-
essary for the plaintiff to establish specific evidence of negligent acts or
conduct, if he can show that in the ordinary course of events the accident
would not have occurred if ordinary care had been observed.48 In order
for res ipsa loquitur to apply the following conditions must be met:
1. The event [product leaving defendant in a defective condition] must
be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of some-
one's negligence;
2. It [product leaving the defendant in a defective condition] must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the defendant;
3. It [product leaving the defendant in a defective condition] must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the plaintiff.49
The effectiveness of res ipsa loquitur in turn often depends upon the at-
titude of a particular court toward the exclusive control requirement, the
second condition listed above. 0 To the extent that a court takes a strin-
gent view and refuses to apply res ipsa loquitur unless the product is in
the physical possession of the defendant, it will be relatively more dif-
ficult for a plaintiff to utilize res ipsa loquitur to show the negligence of
the defendant.
Unless a defect existed in the product when it left the hands of the
defendant, the application of res ipsa loquitur is never reached.' This is
because the function of res ipsa loquitur is to assist the plaintiff in prov-
ing that a defect existed because of the defendant's negligence. There-
fore, when the theory of recovery is switched to warranty or strict liability
res ipsa loquitur will no longer be available to the plaintiff, and it will
not be needed because it will no longer be necessary for the plaintiff to
prove negligence.
Finally, although the plaintiff may be able to prove causation in fact
and some negligent act on the part of the defendant there are some legal
limitations upon the liability of the defendant. These restrictions are
sometimes treated as limitations upon the duty of the seller, and some-
47 See Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YAIE
LJ. 1099, 1114-15 (1960).
48 Schafer v. Wells, 171 Ohio St. 506, 172 NXE.2d 708 (1961).
4 9 W. PRossER, LAW oF TORTS 218 (3rd ed. 1964).50 For a discussion of res ipsa loquitur in Ohio, see Carr, Res Ipsa Loquitur In Ohio: Does
Any "Thing" or "Control" Speak For Itself?, 29 OHio ST. L.J. 399 (1968).51 Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YALE LJ.
1099, 1115 (1960); 1 ERUMER & FRIEDUMN, PRODUCrs LIABITY § 12.03 [1] (1964).
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times as questions of proximate cause, since proximate cause applies to
products liability negligence cases as it similarly does to any other tort
case. Without deciding whether the following are limitations upon the
seller's duty or whether they are problems of proximate cause, it is gen-
erally said that the product must be used by the plaintiff for a purpose and
in a manner which was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.5 2 Fur-
ther, the injury must have resulted from some hazard or risk which was
foreseeable by the defendant, and injury to the plaintiff or to those in a
like situation must have been foreseeable to the defendant. 3
If the plaintiff discovers the defect or danger in the product or should
,have discovered it, he is generally not allowed to recover for the negli-
gence of the seller.5" In the usual case the recovery is denied because of
the plaintiff's contributory negligence, or assumption of risk, but it is
sometimes said that the plaintiff's own negligence is an intervening
cause.
55
B. Commercial Code Warranty
If a state has adopted strict liability, it is debatable whether consumers
will continue to rely upon the commercial code warranty of merchanta-
bility as an alternative -remedy, even where they can meet the require-
quirements of the Code. The courts will be faced with some difficult
problems in delineating the scope and limitations of strict 'liability as it
relates to the code warranties and it may be wise for the consumer not to
become entangled in the process.50 As an example, might a merchant
buyer utilize the remedy of strict liability to recover from a merchant sel-
ler despite a disclaimer of all warranties by the merchant seller? This
and other problems remain to be solved.57
Section 2-314 of the U.C.C. provides that unless expressly excluded, a
seller warrants that goods are of merchantable quality.5 8  Since this pro-
52 1 FRuMER & FRiEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIAImrry § 11.02 (1964).
3Id.; Gedeon v. East Ohio Gas Co., 128 Ohio St. 335, 190 N.E. 924 (1934).
54 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS IABILrIy § 11.02 (1964).
5 5 Both assumption of risk and contributory negligence are defenses in a products liability
case based upon negligence.
5 6 See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability And The Uniform Commercial Code:
A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communications Barriers, 17 W.
REs. L. REv. 1 (1965).
57 Id.
58U.C.C. § 2-314, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27 (Page 1962):
(1) Unless excluded or modified ... , a warranty that the goods shall be merchant-
able is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and ....
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vision only applies to a limited class of persons, the task of the potential
plaintiff will be to bring himself within the protected class. The defendant
must be a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind."59  Generally a
retailer should be included within the category of a merchant, but the
courts in some states, including Ohio, have expressed hesitation in en-
forcing warranties against retailers who were mere conduits for the
goods. 0 To complete the requirements as to parties, the plaintiff must
show that he is either a buyer, a member of the buyer's family, or a guest
in the buyer's home.61 The plaintiff must be able to prove that he has
given notice of the breach of warranty62 to the seller and that the seller
has not disclaimed the warranty of merchantability.63
A seller is guilty of a breach of his warranty of merchantability when
the goods which he sells are unfit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used. If the buyer can prove that the goods were defec-
tive when sold by the defendant he will have established a breach by the
seller. Since the test for a breach of warranty of merchantability is the
same under the U.C.C. as the test for strict liability as it was formulated by
the Ohio Supreme Court, the problem of the "legal defect" will be con-
sidered in the discussion of the legal defect.6
Since the U.C.C. specifies the persons who are covered by the warranty
of merchantability, the problem of the unforeseeable plaintiff does not
arise. However, § 2-7156' provides that the seller is liable for consequen-
tial damages including "injury to person or property proximately result-
ing from any breach of warranty," so that there is still a problem with
proximate cause. The comments to § 2-715 provide that damages are not
proximately caused if the buyer discovered the defect, or if it was unrea-
sonable for the buyer to use the goods without first inspecting for the de-
fect.68
C. Strict Liability In Tort
In an earlier section it was stated that the theory of "implied warranty
in tort" as it was adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court and the theory of
§402A of the Restatement of Torts are merely two different routes to the
59 Id.
60
-McMurray v. Vaughn's Seed Store, 117 Ohio St. 236, 157 N.E. 567 (1927), seems to
say that warranty liability will not be imposed upon a retailer unless he had an opportunity to
inspect the goods or had knowledge of their condition. Contra, are Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman,
57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936); Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc, 46 Ohio
Op. 250, 102 N.E.2d 281 (1951).
61U.C.C. § 2-318, OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.31 (Page 1962).
2 U.C.C. § 2-607 (3), OmUo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.65 (Page 1962).
63 See U.C.C. § 2-316, Omo RE . CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page 1962).
64 See text accompanying note 86 infra.
65 U.C.C. § 2-715, OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.89 (Page 1962).
'6 U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 5, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.89 Comment 5 (Page 1962).
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common end of imposing strict liability upon the manufacturer.67  To
bolster this conclusion, a brief comparison will be made between the re-
quirements of proof as set out by the Restatement and the requirements of
proof as set out by the Ohio Supreme Court in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel
Corporation."8
In Lonzrick, it was stated that in order for the plaintiff to recover he
must prove that:
1. The product was defective;
2. The product was defective at the time it was sold by the manufacturer;
3. The defect in the product caused the product to malfunction while
it was being used for its ordinary intended purpose;
4. The defect was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury;
5. The plaintiff's presence was in a place which the defendant could
reasonably anticipate.69
Item two, part of item three, and part of item four relate to the proof of
causation in fact which has already been covered. The comparable provi-
sion of §402A is "One who sells any product in a defective condition
. . . is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the uld-
mate user or consumer .... 70  The Restatement then goes on to place the
burden of proof upon the plaintiff to show that the product was in a de-
fective condition at the time it left the hands of the seller.7 ' The fore-
going would seem to indicate that strict liability is of no assistance to the
plaintiff in proving causation in fact.
Strict liability however does contain some limitations. One type of lim-
itation relates to the class of victims that is protected. The Restatement
provides that the seller shall be liable to "users and consumers." Although
'these terms are liberally defined,72 the Institute expressly withheld opin-
ion as to whether the section applied to persons other than consumers or
users, thus leaving the individual jurisdiction free to add to the coverageY3
6 7 See text accompanying note 25 sapra.
8 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N..2d 185 (1966).
69 6 Ohio St. 2d at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 192-93.
7 0  sTATEMErNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of this
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
71 d. comment g at 351.
72 Id. comment I at 354, includes passengers in automobiles as well as employees of the ulti-
mate buyer as examples of "Users."
73 Id. Caveat at 348.
[Vol 30
The Lonzrick solution requires that the "plaintiff's presence was in a place
which the defendant could reasonably anticipate,"' 7 and thereby limits the
seller's liability to foreseeable plaintiffs.
Both the Lonzrick decision and the Restatement require that the prod-
uct be used for its ordinary intended use. Lonzfick states this require-
ment expressly,75 and the Restatement provides that a "product is not in a
defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consump-
tion.176
A third type of limitation covers unforeseeable consequences. Under
the Lonzrick formulation a seller is only liable if the injury was proxi-
mately caused by the defect.7  Presumably this provision incorporates
the same foreseeability limitations as were encountered under negligence
law. The Restatement does not expressly limit liability to foreseeable
consequences. It does however limit the seller's liability to the physical
harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to 'his property. 8
Finally, the Restatement provides that the defendant must be a seller.
The comments to § 402A specifically include manufacturers, wholesale
and retail dealers, and operators of restaurants within the definition of a
seller.79 The defendant in Lonzrick was a manufacturer so the Ohio Su-
preme Court did not address itself to this point. Arguably this court will
follow the Restatement and will impose liability upon retailers and/
or wholesalers. Some of the older supreme court decisions and some
lower court decisions at least raise the possibility of a contrary result.80
If a plaintiff successfully conforms to the requirements set out above,
he will still need to show that the product is defective. In strict liability
as in warranty, the exercise of care by the defendant is not a defense and
evidence to that effect ordinarily should not be admitted.8' However,
the defendant may still prove that the product was not defective within
the meaning of strict liability. Under the Restatement formulation, a
product must not only be defective, but this defect must be of such a na-
ture as to be "unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property." The key words segregating actionable from nonactionable de-
fects are "unreasonably dangerous. 82  A product is in an unreasonably
dangerous condition, when it is dangerous to an "extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
74 6 Ohio Sr. 2d at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 192-93.
71 Id.
7 RESTATBMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h at 351 (1965).
77 6 Ohio St 2d at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 192-93.
78 See n. 70 supra.
7 0 RESTATME~NT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f at 350-51 (1965).
8 0 Cases cited note 60 supra.
812 FRLMR & FRMEDMAN, PRODUCTS IABILIY § 16.01 [1] (1964).
8- Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does A Product Have To Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301,
304 (1967).
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the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to [the product'sJ
characteristics." 83
The Lonzrick decision indicates that a product is defective when it
is not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.84 If
fitness for ordinary purpose is taken from the view of the ordinary con-
sumer, then both the Restatement and Lonzrick would seem to determine
legal defectiveness by the expectations of the reasonable consumer. This
concept of a "legal defect" is also encountered in negligence cases and in
cases decided under the commercial code warranty of merchantability.
Consistency would seem to require that a given condition of a product be
judged a legal defect or not a legal defect independently of the theory of
recovery, and this has been suggested to be the proper procedure.8" If
there is a common test -for "legal defectiveness", then it would seem to fol-
low that a plaintiff could profitably tap negligence, warranty, and strict lia-
bility cases in order to gain insights into the meaning of legal defectiveness.
The cases are concerned with two different kinds of defective prod-
ucts. " The first kind involves a "miscarriage of manufacturing""7 in the
sense that the manufacturer would not have sold the product had he
known that the condition existed. This type of case is represented by the
mouse in the coke bottle, or the can of beans which contains a stone. In
these cases consumer expectations have crystalized into some type of objec-
tive criteria which have been communicated to the manufacturer. Both
the manufacturer and the consumer know what to expect from the prod-
uct and it is therefore relatively easy to distinguish defective from non-
defective products. Everyone knows that soft drink bottles should not con-
tain mice.
However in other cases the characteristics of a product are not dear in
the sense that consumers may or may not expect a certain characteristic of
the product. This case is represented by the chicken bone in the chicken
soup case. To resolve this type of case the courts have developed what is
called the "natural-foreign" object test, which generally states that "dele-
terious matter not intended to be present is not a defect if the normally ex-
pected processing of the product by the consumer would either result in
its discovery before consumption, or render it harmless prior thereto." s
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 352 (1965).
84 6 Ohio St 2d at 229, 218 N.E. 2d at 187. This test is identical to that employed under
the warranty of merchantability.
85 Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does A Product Have To Be?, 42 IND. LJ. 301,
304 (1967); Emroch, Pleading and Proof In A Strict Products Liability Case, 1966 INS. L.J.
581, 589.
86 See P. Keeton, Products Liability - Liability Without Fault and The Requirement Of A
Defect, 41 TExAS L. REv. 855, 859 (1963).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 862.
[VOL 30
NOTES
Applying this test the Ohio Supreme Court held that the presence of an
oyster shell in a serving of oysters is not a legal defect.89
A second type of alleged defective products creates more difficulty.90
In this situation the product is sold in the exact condition which the man-
ufacturer intended, so that if a defect is found it will be present in all of
the manufacturer's products of that -kind. Examples are drugs, cigarettes,
or cosmetics. Here either the product cannot be made safe, or the scien-
tific knowledge existing at the time of manufacture has not created a
method by which the beneficial factors may be separated from the harm-
ful results. Absent the situation where the product -is defective because
the manufacturer failed to provide adequate warning or direction, the
courts will be faced with some very difficult judgments. The case of
cigarettes demonstrates the point. On the one hand there is obvious con-
sumer demand for the product, but on the other hand it is relatively certain
that the product is harmful. Further complicating the decision is the fact
that neither the manufacturer nor the consumer knew that the product was
harmful until long after it was up on the market.
Specific tests for various kinds of alleged defective products will not
be developed until these cases are presented to the courts.9 ' To the
extent that standards of defectiveness have developed under negligence
and sales warranty law these standards will most likely be reflected in
the tests which emerge. Although strict liability has probably shifted the
cost of "miscarriages in manufacturing" to the manufacturer, there are
still many areas of products liability in which the consumer will not be
relieved of losses incurred.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Insofar as proving causation is concerned, strict liability is of no as-
sistance to the plaintiff in a products liability case. Under either negli-
89 Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 NE.2d 167 (1960).
90 See P. Keeton, Products Liability - Liability Without Fault And The Requirement of A
Defect, 41 TExAs L.R. 855, 859 (1963); REsrATEmmNT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A, com-
ments h-k at 351-54 (1965).
91 Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does A Product Have To Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301,
331 (1967) concludes that a product is legally defective if it meets the following conditions:
1) The product carries a significant physical risk to a definable class of consumer
and the risk is ascertainable at least by the time of trial.
2) The risk is one that the typical member of the class does not anticipate and guard
against.
3) The risk threatens established consumer expectations with respect to a contem-
plated use and manner of use of the product and a contemplated minimum level
of performance.
4) The seller has reason to know of the contemplated use and, possibly where in-
jurious side effects are involved, has reasonable access to knowledge of the par-
ticular risk involved.
5) The seller knowingly participates in creating the contemplated use, or in other-
wise generating the relevant consumer expectations, in the way attributed to him
by the consumer.
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gence, sales warranty, or strict liability the plaintiff must prove that a
defect existed, that the defect caused the injury, and that the defect exis-
ted when the product left the defendant.
Contrary to negligence, neither strict liability nor the warranty of mer-
chantability require that the plaintiff prove that the defendant was negli-
gent. The importance of this advantage will depend upon the number of
cases in which the plaintiff can prove that a defect existed when the
product left the hands of the defendant, and yet cannot prove that the
defendant was negligent even with the help of res ipsa loqvitur. Some
writers have suggested that there are few cases like this. In cases where
the plaintiff cannot sue the manufacturer because of jurisdictional reasons,
the plaintiff will want to turn to the retailer or the wholesaler. If this
happens, both the warranty of merchantability and strict liability will be
more effective than negligence because in many cases the retailer or whole-
saler is simply not negligent.
To the extent that the courts required privity of contract under the
U.C.C., strict liability provides an obvious advantage in that privity is no
longer necessary. The U.C.C. itself eliminated some of the more out-
rageous results of the requirement of privity by including the members of
the buyer's family and his guests within the coverage of the warranty be-
tween the buyer and the seller. Strict liability also eliminated two other
troublesome provisions of the U.C.C. warranty of merchantability. Un-
der the U.C.C. the seller can disclaim any of the warranties which the
code imposes and there is also the requirement that the seller be given no-
tice of his breach of warranty.
Aside from eliminating the nuisance of having to prove negligence of
the defendant by 'invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is doubtful
whether the advantages of strict 'liability justify all the furor that it has
created. If strict liability does result in the imposition of greater liability
upon the manufacturer, much of the increase will have to come from a
change in judicial attitudes since the provisions of strict liability still re-
quire a showing of legal defectiveness.
David M. Kauffman
